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Improving Economic Sanctions in the
States
Jessica M. Eaglin

†

INTRODUCTION
Economic sanctions provide an appealing alternative to incarceration in the face of state budget cuts and the increasing
pressures of mass incarceration. In theory, monetary sanctions
provide a measure to impose punishment on the offender without incarceration, all while funding the criminal justice system.
In many European countries, economic sanctions provide just
1
such an alternative.
But once again, the United States exemplifies its
2
exceptionalism in the context of punishment. Here in the United States, economic sanctions do not replace incarceration; ra3
ther, they supplement and extend traditional punishment. As
† Counsel, Justice Program, Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School
of Law. J.D./M.A. in Literature, Duke University School of Law; B.A., Spelman
College. The author thanks Alicia Bannon, Kevin Reitz, and Deuel Ross for
their helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article. Special thanks to the
entire Minnesota Law Review for the invitation to participate in the 2014
Symposium, Offenders in the Community: Reshaping Sentencing and Supervision. Additional thanks to Hannah Kirshner for her research assistance. All
errors are my own. Copyright © 2014 by Jessica M. Eaglin.
1. See Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction:
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509,
513–15 (2011).
2. The United States is the leading incarcerator in the world. Highest to
Lowest - Prison Population Total, INT’L CTR. PRISON STUD., http://www
.prisonstudies.org/highest-to-lowest/prison-population-total?field_region_
taxonomy_tid=All (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (showing the world’s prison population rates). Several aspects of our justice system, from incarcerating juvenile
offenders to the severity of our penal system, are exceptional in the context of
other countries with similar political economies. See Sharon Dolovich, Foreword: Incarceration American-Style, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 237, 237–38
(2009) (describing unique features of the U.S. criminal justice system that
make it exceptional); Nicola Lacey, American Imprisonment in Comparative
Perspective, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 102, 106 (examining “American ‘penal exceptionalism’” based upon political structures).
3. Beckett & Harris, supra note 1, at 509; Alexes Harris et al., Drawing
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states struggle to close budget gaps produced by the untenable
pressures of mass incarceration, economic sanctions are in4
creasing without much restraint. Many states are expanding
the types of offenses that trigger economic fines as the principle
5
punishment. At the same time, economic sanctions increasing6
ly finance critical aspects of the criminal justice system.
This trend is developing in contrast to the reality that most
offenders cannot pay economic sanctions in full. The average
formerly incarcerated male lives at or below the poverty line in
7
the United States. While courts are constitutionally required
8
to consider an individual’s ability to pay economic sanctions,
9
evidence demonstrates that they regularly do not. As a result,
many offenders face unmanageable criminal justice debt upon
10
release into the community. Moreover, aggressive collection
practices and profit-oriented collection services make the outcome of economic sanctions, i.e., criminal justice debt, a road11
block to successful reintegration to society.
When the American Law Institute (ALI) set out to revise
12
and update the Model Penal Code, one of the major undertakings of the project was re-envisioning the use of economic sanctions as punishment. Since 2001 the ALI Reporters have considered and drafted several versions of the revised Code to
create an approach to economic sanctions that balances oft13
competing perspectives on this method of punishment. These
drafts tried to find the right compromise between allowing
Blood from Stones: Legal Debt and Social Inequality in the Contemporary
United States, 115 AM. J. SOC. 1753, 1770 (2010) (“[M]onetary sanctions are
now a common supplement to confinement and criminal justice supervision.”).
4. See infra notes 46–52 and accompanying text.
5. See infra Part I.
6. Id.
7. See 2014 Poverty Guidelines, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty/14poverty.cfm (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (a single
individual lives at the poverty line in the United States if he or she earns
$11,670 per year); see infra notes 93–94.
8. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 698–69 (1983).
9. See infra notes 113–123 and accompanying text.
10. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 7–10 (2010); infra Part II.
11. See BANNON ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, supra note 10, at 24–
29. For more discussion, see infra Part II.
12. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Tentative Draft No. 3, approved
with amendments May 19, 2014).
13. Professor Kevin Reitz has worked as the Model Penal Code: Sentencing Reporter since 2001. He was joined by Cecelia Klingele as Associate Reporter in 2012. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING (Lance Liebman, Foreword,
Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014).
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courts to use economic sanctions as an alternative method of
punishment and setting realistic limits on the use of economic
14
sanctions to promote an offender’s reintegration into society.
The current version of the revised Code takes pivotal steps
to improve economic sanctions. First, it prohibits costs, assessments, and other “user fees” that require offenders to pay for
15
services in the criminal justice system. Second, in the event
that such assessments are not eliminated, the revised Code
clarifies the hierarchy of payment, prioritizing restitution over
16
any other court-imposed costs or fees. Finally, it caps economic sanctions based upon a “reasonable financial subsistence”
17
standard. This standard limits the total amount of economic
sanctions that a court can impose on the individual based upon
the amount required to maintain reasonable necessities for the
18
individual and his or her family. These measures will do much
to address the dangers of unfettered economic sanctions in the
states, from the appearance of a conflict of interest in the court
system to the unconstitutional incarceration of offenders for
19
their failure to pay criminal justice debt.
Though these measures provide critical improvements, the
revised Code avoids tackling one of the key problems with economic sanctions in the states: defining ability-to-pay determinations. Courts are constitutionally required to assess whether
20
an individual can pay court-imposed debts. Courts vary in
their interpretation of this mandate, with some courts making
the determination before or after the imposition of fines, and
some measuring the individual’s ability to pay at the time of
21
sentencing or in the future, based on predicted earning power.
14. See Kevin Reitz, Economic Rehabilitation of Offenders: Recommendations of the Model Penal Code (Second), 99 MINN. L. REV. 1735, 1739 (2015)
(“The widespread practice in American law is to impose economic penalties
with uncertain chances of collection and with insufficient concern for their
long-term impact on offender reintegration and public safety.”).
15. User fees are “financial obligations imposed not for any traditional
criminal justice purpose such as punishment, deterrence, or rehabilitation but
rather to fund tight state budgets.” BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. The
Code recommends eliminating such costs. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6.04D (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014). For further discussion, see infra Part
III.
16. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(10) (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2014); see infra Part III.
17. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2014).
18. Id. § 6.04(B).
19. See infra Part III.
20. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 668–70 (1983).
21. See infra Part II.
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The revised Code addresses this issue by establishing the “reasonable financial subsistence” standard and requiring an assessment prior to the imposition of cumulative fees and fines. It
does not, however, define the “reasonable subsistence” standard
with specificity; rather, the Code leaves this measure to the
22
discretion of judges and legislatures for clarification. Such a
step is in line with the drafters’ desire to promote different
23
practices amongst the states, but it leaves unanswered a
24
question that courts consistently struggle to address.
This Article makes two interventions in relation to the
Code’s efforts to improve economic sanctions. First, it proposes
measures that can build on the important improvements captured in the revised Code. These measures include reforms to
increase the amount of information available to courts and the
public relating to the accumulation of criminal justice debt and
the creation of monitoring agencies to provide individuals within the justice system with more information about the economic
sanctions imposed upon them. Second, this Article observes
how rational use of economic sanctions as a method of punishment in the United States is inextricably intertwined with two
trends in justice reform: the budget crisis in state court sys25
26
tems and the pressures of budget-cut criminal justice reform.
22. See infra Part III.
23. The states are considered experimental grounds in sentencing reform,
and accordingly we expect some variety in their methods and use of punishment. At the same time, since the 1970s there has been a focused effort to reduce unwarranted disparities in sentencing between different judges in the
same jurisdiction and to guide unfettered discretion. This Article argues that
the disparities in use of and approach to economic sanctions require further
guidance regarding discretion beyond that provided by the revised Model Penal Code. See infra Part IV.A.
24. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU Fund of Mich. et al. in Support
of Joseph Bailey, at 16, People v. Bailey, 2014 WL 310203 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan.
28, 2014) (No. 311682) (“Although pay-or-stay sentences are routine in some
courts in Michigan, there is a troubling lack of consistency in the imposition of
these sentences.”); ACLU, IN FOR A PENNY: THE RISE OF AMERICA’S NEW
DEBTORS’ PRISONS 17–80 (2010) (describing limited ability-to-pay analyses
conducted in Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Georgia, and Washington). For further discussion, see infra Section III.
25. The economic downturn in 2008 resulted in a significant decrease in
funding to state courts. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Cutbacks in California Court
System Produce Long Lines, Short Tempers, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2014), http://
www.latimes.com/local/la-me-court-cuts-20140511-story.html (pointing to the
economic downturn as the cause of court underfunding). This development
spread to the federal judiciary with sequestration. Adam Liptak, Budget Cuts
Imperil Federal Court System, Roberts Says, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 31, 2013), http://
www.nytimes.com/2014/01/01/us/politics/budget-cuts-imperil-court-system
-chief-justice-says.html. As a result, state courts have sought funding from alternative sources to address this crisis. E.g., Dolan, supra (explaining that
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These trends perversely disincentivize courts and legislatures
27
from reining in the severity of economic sanctions. Though the
revised Code discourages the use of economic sanction proceeds
28
to support court operations, courts may continue to rely on
revenue from monetary sanctions to supplement their budgets
29
unless legislatures revitalize court funding. At the same time,
cost-effectiveness increasingly justifies and motivates criminal
30
justice reforms. This cost-cutting environment drives states to
31
continue transferring justice system costs to offenders. These
trends may exist in tension with the Model Penal Code’s efforts
to create a revised approach to economic sanctions. They will
also affect the revised Code’s ability to successfully improve the
32
imposition of economic sanctions in the long-term.
Though economic sanctions are an appealing sentencing
option given the economic and fiscal pressures mass incarceration places on the American justice system, this Article does not
suggest that the expansion of economic sanctions is the answer
to reducing mass incarceration. Economic sanctions can and do
pull a broad scope of individuals into the justice system who
33
may not need to be there at all. Rather, this Article focuses on
how to improve the use of economic sanctions whether it is used
as an alternative to incarceration, a supplement to incarceration, or a standalone sanction.

Kings County Superior Court held a garage sale to raise money). As part of
that response, courts are more aggressively collecting debts from criminal offenders. See infra Part I.
26. States and the federal government have implemented reforms to reduce reliance on incarceration as a cost-saving measure. See infra Part I. Such
reforms show great potential in reducing overincarceration in the United
States, but they also present perils to the extent that reforms that save money
do not necessarily improve the justice system. See Jessica M. Eaglin, Against
Neorehabilitation, 66 SMU L. REV. 189, 210–22 (2013); Mary D. Fan, Beyond
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. Rev. 581,
630–33 (2012); Marie Gottschalk, Cell Blocks & Red Ink: Mass Incarceration,
the Great Recession & Penal Reform, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 62, 63, 67–
69.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(D) (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2014).
29. See infra Part IV.
30. See Eaglin, supra note 26, at 202; Fan, supra note 26, at 70; Jessica
M. Eaglin, The Drug Court Paradigm, at 26 (forthcoming 2015); see infra notes
201–202 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 59–70 and accompanying text.
32. See infra Part IV.
33. See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015).
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This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I describes the rise
of economic sanctions in recent decades. Part II demonstrates
the troubling outcome of this development: the associated rise
of criminal justice debt. It also chronicles the variety of approaches courts take in determining whether an individual has
the ability to pay economic sanctions. Part III provides an overview of the Model Penal Code’s improvements to economic
sanctions, with a particular emphasis on the new “reasonable
financial subsistence” standard. Part IV proposes additional
measures to supplement the reforms embodied in the revised
Model Penal Code. It also discusses how funding shortages in
the courts and budget-cut criminal justice reform may prevent
efforts to improve economic sanctions in the states. The Article
then concludes.
I. THE EXPANSION OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
Between 1972 and 2010, the U.S. prison population increased exponentially, from fewer than 200,000 prisoners to
34
more than 1.6 million. Including jails, the United States now
incarcerates approximately 2.3 million people on any given
35
36
day. By 2012, one in 108 American adults was incarcerated.
During these decades, the contours of American exceptionalism
expanded as the United States acquired the distinction of lead37
ing incarcerator in the world. Today, despite minor decreases
38
in recent years, the current rate of incarceration remains far
34. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS 1925–81 tbl.1 (1982),
available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p2581.pdf (showing 196,092
sentenced prisoners in 1972); E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2013, at 2 tbl.1 (2014). The U.S. rate of incarceration grew exponentially as well. In 1972, the United States incarcerated 161
residents per 100,000 in the population. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES 33 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014). By 2012, the United
States incarcerated 707 per 100,000, or more than four times the rate in 1972.
Id.
35. There are approximately 1.55 million individuals incarcerated in state
and federal prisons in the United States. CARSON, supra note 34, at 1. Additionally, there are more than 730,000 individuals incarcerated in local jails
across the country. TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013 - STATISTICAL TABLES 1
(2014).
36. OLIVER ROEDER, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, WHAT CAUSED
THE CRIME DECLINE? PRISON, POLICING, AND OTHER THEORIES 20 (forthcoming 2015).
37. INT’L CTR. PRISON STUD., supra note 2 (showing the world’s prison
population rates).
38. CARSON, supra note 34, at 1.

2015]

IMPROVING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1843

outsized in comparison to the average pre-1980s rate, and to
the rates of other countries with similar political and economic
39
structures.
Other aspects of the criminal justice system expanded
along with the increasing prison population. In 2012, about 4.8
million offenders were serving sentences of probation or parole
40
in the United States. Not unlike incarceration, the United
States places individuals on probation and parole at a rate far
outsized in comparison to other democratic countries around
41
the world. In other words, “mass incarceration” and “mass su42
pervision” developed in tandem in the United States.
These phenomena created untenable pressures on the
criminal justice system. State and federal correctional costs
43
now exceed $80 billion per year. After adding judicial, legal,
44
and police costs, this amount climbs to $260 billion annually.
Since the Great Recession, budget constraints in the states
45
have resulted in funding cuts to court systems. As a result,
ever-growing offender populations cycle through cash-strapped
justice systems.

39. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 33 & n.1; THE
SENTENCING PROJECT, TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2014), available at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_
sheet.pdf. Compare Lacey, supra note 2, at 108 (asserting that U.S. penal disparity must be examined by “unraveling longer-term institutional dynamics”),
with INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, supra note 2 (displaying U.S. penal disparity against other countries’ prison populations).
40. LAUREN E. GLAZE & ERINN J. HERBERMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2012, at 3
(2012).
41. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.03, reporters’ note, at e (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2014) (acknowledging that the rates of probation and
postrelease supervision in the United States are, by international standards,
as exceptional as U.S. incarceration rates).
42. See id. (“Arguably, the U.S. engages in ‘mass probation’ or ‘mass supervision’ . . . on a par with the nation’s ‘mass imprisonment’ or ‘mass incarceration.’”); Michelle S. Phelps, The Paradox of Probation: Community Supervision in the Age of Mass Incarceration, 35 LAW & POL’Y 51, 66 (2013)
(demonstrating a correlation between larger increases in probation rates and
larger increases in incarceration rates between the 1980s and 2000s).
43. INIMAI CHETTIAR ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, REFORMING
FUNDING TO REDUCE MASS INCARCERATION 9 (2013).
44. Id.
45. See DANIEL J. HALL, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, RESHAPING THE
FACE OF JUSTICE: THE ECONOMIC TSUNAMI CONTINUES 1 (asserting that “[t]he
Great Recession continues to leave state courts reeling,” as state court administrators reported that twenty-nine states had budget decreases in fiscal year
2011, thirty-five state courts reported deficits in 2010, and in 2009 thirty-three
state courts reported deficits.).
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Within this context, economic sanctions are emerging as an
46
understudied but oft-used method of punishment. “Economic
sanctions” broadly refer to any legal financial obligations, including restitution, fines, and fees. Restitution compensates a
47
victim for harm stemming from criminal wrongdoing. “Fines”
are sanctions imposed on an offender to punish him or her for
48
criminal wrongdoing. The imposition of fines is relatively rare
49
in the United States. Fees, on the other hand, have no relation
to the criminal offense; rather, this type of economic sanction is
imposed on the offender to offset costs in the criminal justice
50
system.
During the era of mass incarceration, the prevalence of restitution orders increased. At the federal level, Congress steadily
51
expanded restitution starting in 1990. By 1996, it enacted legislation requiring restitution for crimes of violence and proper52
ty offenses. Similar legislative trends developed in the states.
By 2004, one-third of states required courts to order restitution
53
to victims in cases involving certain types of crimes. Restitution repayment has a utilitarian effect. Repayment of this eco46. While “the widespread use and potential harms of economic sanctions
have received minimal attention in the academic literature,” Beth A. Colgan,
Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 284 (2014), specific policy organizations, academics, and practitioners are raising awareness
about this issue. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776; Wayne A. Logan
& Ronald F. Wright, Mercenary Criminal Justice, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1175;
ACLU, supra note 24, at 11 (urging better data collection by jurisdictions to
better study economic sanctions and debt collection practices); BANNON ET AL.,
supra note 10. Economic sanctions represent a trend that expands beyond just
state governments. As more and more government functions in the criminal
justice system are privatized, the fees and fines associated with the criminal
justice system increase. See, e.g., ACLU supra note 24, at 59–61. Though this
issue is outside the scope of this Article, the restrictions on imposition of economic sanctions may have some effect in the privatized context as well.
47. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
48. Id.
49. See, e.g., Pat O’Malley, Politicizing the Case for Fines, 10
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 547, 551 (2011) (“[M]ost countries outside the
United States rely heavily on fines and have done so for many decades.”).
50. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 12.
51. See Crime Control Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 2509, 104 Stat.
4789, 4863 (1990) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)) (broadening
scope of offenses that qualify for restitution to include defendant’s conduct in a
scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of conduct).
52. See Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), Pub. L. No.
104-132, § 204, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3663(a)).
53. Restitution, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS CRIME, http://www
.victimsofcrime.org/help-for-crime-victims/get-help-bulletins-for-crimevictims/restitution (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
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nomic sanction is proven to decrease recidivism amongst of54
fenders. Despite this reality, many states do not prioritize repayment of this sanction above other legal financial obliga55
tions.
Due to the pressures on justice systems created by mass
incarceration, some states are shifting toward fines-based punishment as a viable alternative to incarceration for low-level offenses. Decriminalization of certain low-level offenses has
grown in popularity in recent years. For example, in 2010, the
American Bar Association Commission on Homelessness and
Poverty urged jurisdictions “to undertake a comprehensive review of the misdemeanor provisions of their criminal laws, and,
where appropriate, to allow the imposition of civil fines or
56
nonmonetary civil remedies instead of criminal sanctions.”
Many states responded by reclassifying offenses as
57
“nonjailable” or “fines-only.”
The decriminalization of possession of marijuana serves as
an excellent example of how states reclassifying offenses leads
to the creation of more economic sanctions in the justice system. Decriminalization means “the reduction or elimination of
traditional criminal penalties for conduct that remains prohib58
ited.” This is distinguished from legalization, which removes
59
conduct from criminal regulation entirely. Two states—
54. Id.
55. All states and the federal government prioritize child support over
restitution. DOUGLAS N. EVANS, JOHN JAY COLLEGE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
THE DEBT PENALTY: EXPOSING THE FINANCIAL BARRIERS TO OFFENDER
REINTEGRATION 6, 8 (2014). In some states, legal fees and fines are also prioritized over restitution. Id.
56. AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION COMM’N ON
HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 16, 19
(2009).
57. For example, North Carolina revised its misdemeanor grid to transform many misdemeanor offenses into fine-only offenses while reclassifying
certain offenses to qualify for that designation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A1340.23(d) (2013) (revising the Code in 2013 to provide that “[u]nless otherwise provided for a specific offense, the judgment for a person convicted of a
Class 3 misdemeanor who has no more than three prior convictions shall consist only of a fine”); 7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 18B.14 (2013) (reclassifying some
misdemeanors from Class 2 to Class 3 offenses); see also SPAGENBURG
PROJECT, CTR. FOR JUSTICE, LAW & SOC’Y AT GEORGE MASON UNIV., AN
UPDATE ON STATE EFFORTS IN MISDEMEANOR RECLASSIFICATION, PENALTY
REDUCTION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, at i (2010) (recognizing “significant movement” toward states reclassifying low level misdemeanors into
charges that do not carry the possibility of confinement).
58. Natapoff, supra note 33, at 11.
59. Id. at 12 (decriminalization “merely reduces and/or alters the penalties for engaging in . . . impermissible behavior” as opposed to legalization
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Colorado and Washington—legalized marijuana in 2012. By
2014, thirty-four states plus the District of Columbia implemented legislation to legalize its medicinal use or decriminalize
the substance in part (for medical use) or in full (for minor of61
fenses). Many of these states have only “partially” decriminal62
ized possession, meaning the offense is reclassified as a
nonjailable misdemeanor. In other words, these offenses now
result in the imposition of fines for offenders, as opposed to incarceration. This trend suggests that further experimentation
with marijuana decriminalization will expand the imposition of
63
economic sanctions as a primary method of punishment.
The most troubling increase in economic sanctions occurred
in relation to “user fees.” Fees emerged in the 1970s to supple64
ment criminal justice systems, and since the 1990s have in65
creased in scope. Individuals are increasingly expected to pay
for various aspects of their adjudication in the criminal justice
where the behavior is not prohibited).
60. See COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 16 (amended 2012); WASH. REV. CODE
§§ 69.50.363, 69.50.101(t)–(y) (codifying Initiative Measure No. 502, approved
Nov. 6, 2012).
61. David Firestone, Let States Decide on Marijuana, N.Y. TIMES, July 27,
2014, at SR.10; see State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 29. 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state
-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx (“A total of 23 states, the District of Columbia
and Guam now allow for comprehensive public medical marijuana and cannabis programs.”).
62. See State Laws with Alternatives to Incarceration for Marijuana Possession, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT, http://www.mpp.org/assets/pdfs/library/
State-Decrim-Chart.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2015). States that have partially
decriminalized possession are Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Nebraska, Nevada, and New York. See id.
63. Cf. Editorial, Repeal Prohibition, Again, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2014, at
SR.1 (discussing the “rapidly growing movement among the states to reform
marijuana laws”).
64. O’Malley, supra note 49, at 551.
65. Alan Rosenthal & Marsha Weissman, Sentencing for Dollars: The Financial Consequences of a Criminal Conviction 13 (Feb. 1, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Center for Community Alternatives Justice
Strategies) (asserting that “the use of financial penalties has flourished since
the early 1990’s”); see also Ronald F. Wright & Wayne A. Logan, The Political
Economy of Application Fees for Indigent Criminal Defense, 47 WILLIAM &
MARY L. REV. 2045, 2054 (2006) (asserting that application fee laws have
gained popularity over the past decade, increasing by 300% from 1994 to
2004); see also, e.g., REBEKAH DILLER, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, THE
HIDDEN COSTS OF FLORIDA’S CRIMINAL JUSTICE FEES 5 (2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/Justice/FloridaF&F.pdf
(“From 1996 through 2007, the Florida Legislature created or authorized more
than 20 new categories of legal financial obligations (‘LFOs’) – surcharges,
fees, and other monetary obligations – related to criminal cases and violations.”).
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system. Such fees include public defender fees, daily jail fees,
68
69
court administration fees, DNA database costs, drug testing
70
71
costs, probation supervision fees, and other fees. These fees
66. See Joseph Shapiro, As Court Fees Rise, The Poor Are Paying the Price,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), http://www.npr.org/templates/
transcript/transcript.php?storyId=312158516 (explaining the results of a nationwide survey conducted by NPR with help from NYU’s Brennan Center for
Justice and the National Center for State Courts, discovering that at least forty-three states and the District of Columbia allow for a defendant to be billed
for a public defender); see also Wright & Logan, supra note 65, at 2046, 2052
(claiming that since the early 1990s, there has been a rise in the number of
states authorizing or compelling judges to impose fees on indigent criminal
defendants who seek appointed counsel).
67. See Shapiro, supra note 66 (reporting that forty-one states may charge
inmates room and board for jail and prison stays); see e.g., ALA. CODE § 14-622(a)(1)–(3) (2011) (requiring defendants in misdemeanor cases to pay for
housing, maintenance, and medical costs in addition to a jail incarceration fee
of up to $20 per day, which may be remitted upon a showing of hardship);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-804.01 (2010) (imposing a fee, based on the costs of
incarceration and the person’s ability to pay, for those convicted of a misdemeanor); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1c(a), 1203.1m(a) (2014) (authorizing
courts to charge a fee for defendants who must serve a period of confinement
in jail as a term of probation or a conditional sentence and to require defendants to pay the reasonable cost of incarceration in state prison after making a
determination of their ability to pay); FLA. STAT. § 951.033(2)–(3) (2014) (authorizing detention facilities to determine the financial status of prisoners and
require prisoners to “pay for all or a fair portion of daily subsistence costs”);
GA. CODE ANN. § 42-1-4(d) (2014) (requiring that “[a]n amount determined to
be the cost of the inmate’s keep and confinement” be deducted from the earnings of inmates participating in work-release programs); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 890.2(A)–(B) (2014) (after making a determination of a defendant’s ability to pay, courts may impose an additional fine equal to the expected costs to the state of imprisonment); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 801.83(1)(a)
(2009) (authorizing counties to seek reimbursement of up to $60 per day of imprisonment for the entire period the person was confined, including any period
of pretrial); N.Y. CORRECTION LAW § 189.2 (Consol. 2014) (imposing a maximum $1 per week incarceration fee for each week of confinement); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 7A-313 (2014) (providing that persons lawfully confined in jail awaiting trial are liable to pay the country or municipality maintaining the jail $10
for every 24 hours of confinement the unless the case has been dismissed).
68. See, e.g., Other Statutory Provisions, CT. COSTS, FEES & FINES FOR
MUN. CTS. (Tex. Comptroller Pub. Accounts, Austin, Tex.), 2009, at 3, available at http://www.texasahead.org/lga/96-864.pdf; Fines, Fees, Costs, and Rates,
MICHIGAN CTS., http://courts.mi.gov/administration/admin/pages/fines,-fees,
-costs,-and-rates.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2015).
69. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 60.35(1)(a)(v) (McKinney 2015) (requiring
defendants convicted of an offense under N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995(7) (McKinney
2015) to pay a $50 DNA databank fee); see also Paris Achen, ACLU Finds
Clark County Courts Set Excessive Fines on Felons, COLUMBIAN, Feb. 24, 2014,
available
at
http://www.columbian.com/news/2014/feb/24/aclu-finds-clark
-county-courts-set-excessive-fines (finding that Washington state requires
judges to impose a $100 DNA database fee).
70. See e.g., FLA. STAT. § 948.034(1)(a)4 (requiring any person who resides
in a community residential drug punishment center to submit to routine drug
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increasingly represent normal assessments in the United
States. Today, at least forty-three states and the District of Co72
lumbia may charge defendants a public defender fee. In fortyone states, inmates may be charged for room and board during
73
a jail stay. In forty-four states, individuals may be billed for
74
probation and parole supervision. Interestingly, fees have increased in part to offset diminishing funding for alternatives to
75
incarceration. In all states except Hawaii and the District of
Columbia, persons are charged for electronic monitoring devic76
es used for court supervision.
Portions of economic sanctions collected may also support
rehabilitative services offered for other offenders. For example,
testing and bear the costs of such testing); see also Rosenthal & Weissman,
supra note 65, at 16 (asserting that many counties have enacted local legislation authorizing the collection of fees for “services” such as drug testing); see
also e.g., Fines and Fees, S. CTR. FOR HUM. RTS., https://www.schr.org/
our-work/debtors-prisons (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (finding that courts in
Georgia are assessing more fees, including the cost of drug tests, to help meet
costs of the criminal justice system).
71. See Joseph Shapiro, Measures Aimed At Keeping People Out of Jail
Punish the Poor, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 24, 2014, 4:58 PM), http://www
.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=314866421 (finding that
in at least forty-four states offenders can be billed for their own probation and
parole supervision); see e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-2(a) (requiring defendants to
pay a $40 per month fee toward the cost of supervision for parole or probation); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1203.1b(a), 1203.1e(a)–(b) (mandating that a defendant pay all or a portion of the reasonable cost of probation or parole supervision after a determination of a defendant’s ability to pay); FLA. STAT.
§ 948.09(1)(a) (requiring any person on parole or probation to pay the total
sum equal to the amount of court-imposed supervision time); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 42-8-34(d)(1) (imposing a $23 per month probation fee in addition to a onetime $50 fee for defendants convicted of a felony); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 257-c
(McKinney 2015) (imposing a $30 per month fee for DWI-related probation supervision); MO. REV. STAT. § 217.690.3 (2014) (allowing the board to require
payment of a fee up to $60 per month for probation supervision); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 15A-1343(cl) (requiring defendants to pay a $40 monthly fee for supervised probation unless exempted by the court); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2951.021(A)(1) (2014) (allowing courts to impose a monthly probation fee); 18
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 11.1102(c) (2014) (mandating a monthly fee for parole
and probation).
72. Shapiro, supra note 71.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See id.
76. Id.; see, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-8-35(a)(14) (authorizing the Georgia
Department of Corrections to assess and collect fees from probationers for
electronic surveillance or global positioning satellite system monitoring); Pretrial Services, ALACHUACOUNTY.US, http://www.alachuacounty.us/Depts/
CourtServices/Pages/PretrialServices.aspx (noting that defendants in Alachua
County, Florida “supervised on electronic monitoring pay nominal fees to defray program costs”).

2015]

IMPROVING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS

1849

California’s recently adopted Proposition 47 converts sentences
for low-level nonviolent crimes such as drug possession and
77
petty theft from felonies to misdemeanors for most offenders.
The anticipated financial savings from this reform are explicitly earmarked: 25% of the savings will be directed to school programs designed to prevent crime; 10% will be directed to
“trauma recovery services for crime victims”; and 65% will be
directed to “mental health and substance abuse treatment pro78
grams to reduce recidivism of people in the justice system.”
Fees and fines may be used to support victim-related pro79
gramming as well.
The use of economic sanctions is largely unfettered. Judges
enjoy a great deal of discretion when imposing economic sanc80
tions. Very little guidance exists on how or when to use this
81
sanction. As economic sanctions are becoming more common,
82
they may be more severe and more onerous as well. Though
many fees and fines fall within the judge’s discretion to impose,
states have increasingly created mandatory economic sanctions
by statute. For example, the Florida legislature increased the
mandatory fine for solicitation of prostitution from $500 to
83
$5,000 in 2013. In Pennsylvania, the legislature created a
84
mandatory minimum fine of $75,000 for misdemeanor theft.
Washington law requires courts to conduct a victim “penalty

77. Specifically, this proposition requires misdemeanor sentences for two
types of “wobbler” offenses: drug possession offenses, and petty theft, stolen
property and forging/writing bad checks where the amount is $950 or less, unless the offender was previously convicted of rape, murder, child molestation
and/or is a registered sex offender. See Proposition 47: Criminal Sentences,
Misdemeanor Penalties, Initiative Statute, CALIFORNIA GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 4, 2014: OFFICIAL VOTER INFORMATION GUIDE 34 (2014),
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/pdf/complete-vig.pdf#page=
70.
78. Id. at 76.
79. Id.; see also Barry Ruback, The Benefits and Costs of Economic Sanctions: Considering the Victim, the Offender and Society, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1779,
1800 (2015).
80. See Ruback, supra note 79, at 1787–05.
81. See id.; see also id. at 1810.
82. See id. at 1828 (noting that a Human Rights Watch report found “that
courts do little to determine whether offenders are actually able to pay their
fines and fees”).
83. Children and Minors – Sexual Exploitation – Florida Safe Harbor Act,
ch. 2012-105, § 769.07, 2012 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. (West); see FLA. STAT.
§ 796.07(6) (2014).
84. Pennsylvania Race Horse Development and Gaming Act, ch. 4,
§ 1518(b)(2)(i)(A), 2004 Pa. Laws 75, invalidated by Commonwealth v. Eisenberg, 98 A.3d 1268 (Pa. 2014).

1850

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:1837
85

assessment” every time an individual is convicted of a crime.
Even in “victimless” crimes, the court must impose these fines,
amounting to $500 per felony and $250 per misdemeanor, in
86
addition to any other required fees and fines. These laws
demonstrate how economic sanctions are expanding without
check from the legislature; indeed, the legislatures are attempting to eliminate judicial discretion in some instances.
II. INABILITY TO PAY AND THE RISE OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE DEBT
The rise of economic sanctions is disconnected from the reality of incarceration—specifically, that the majority of offenders are unable to pay the fees and fines imposed by the courts
in accordance with legislation. As a result, more individuals
bear the burden of criminal justice debt and more courts bear
the burden of trying to collect unpaid debts.
Most offenders lack the resources to pay growing courtimposed fees and fines. Before incarceration, most offenders re87
quire assistance in obtaining legal counsel. Upon release, em88
ployment opportunities for ex-offenders are bleak. Studies
demonstrate that the likelihood of receiving a callback from a
job application declines by fifty percent where the individual
85. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1) (2014).
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.68.035(1)(a). For a comprehensive summary of
the breadth and consequences of contemporary economic sanctions, see
Colgan, supra note 46, at 284–95.
87. By 1996, almost seventy-five percent of state prisoners received publicly provided legal counsel of convictions leading to incarceration. BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDIGENT DEFENSE (1996), available at http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/id.pdf.
88. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 34, at 233 (collecting studies
demonstrating that “roughly half [of ex-prisoners] remain jobless up to a year
after their release”). This is partially on account of the social stigma of a criminal record, which detrimentally affects offenders’ ability to obtain employment whether they have been incarcerated in prison or simply placed under
correctional supervision. See Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration &
Social Inequality, DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 14 (discussing an audit study
that “offers clear evidence for the negative effects of criminal stigma”). Accordingly, the opportunity for offenders captures a broader swath of individuals
beyond just those sent to prison. Indeed, the Brennan Center calculates that
nearly 70 million Americans, or approximately thirty percent of the adult population, have criminal records. See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra note 43, at 3 & 49
n.5; see also MICHELLE NATIVIDAD RODRIGUEZ & MAURICE EMSELLEM, NAT’L
EMP’T LAW PROJECT, 65 MILLION “NEED NOT APPLY”: THE CASE FOR
REFORMING CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR EMPLOYMENT 27 n.2 (2011),
available at http://www.nelp.org/page/-/SCLP/2011/65_Million_Need_Not_
Apply.pdf (estimating that 65 million adults have criminal records in the
United States).
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has a criminal record. For African Americans and Latinos,
this reality is particularly damaging to employment opportunities. Minorities without a criminal record are less likely than
white applicants just released from prison to obtain employ90
ment. Criminal records significantly reduce the odds of a
black or Hispanic applicant receiving a job offer. Indeed, the
odds of a black applicant with a criminal record receiving a job
91
are reduced by 57%. Even for those offenders who can obtain
employment, serving time in prison or jail depresses annual
92
earnings significantly. The average formerly incarcerated
93
white male earns only approximately $12,094 per year. Black
94
and Hispanic offenders earn less. The stigma of conviction
makes employment, housing, and other basic necessities diffi95
cult to obtain. Again, these disadvantages are disproportionately borne by African Americans and Latinos, who often face
discrimination in accessing housing regardless of criminal records. Adding criminal justice debt to the challenges an individual faces upon criminal conviction only further burdens the in89. Western & Pettit, supra note 88 (discussing Devah Pager’s experimental studies on job seekers with criminal records).
90. U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF CRIMINAL
BACKGROUND CHECKS AND THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION’S CONVICTION RECORDS POLICY 196 (2012) (statement of Glenn
E. Martin, Vice President, Development and Public Affairs, Director, David
Rothenberg Center for Public Policy at the Fortune Society).
91. Id.
92. Studies show that serving time in either prison or jail reduces hourly
wages for men by approximately 11%, annual employment by nine weeks and
annual earnings by 40%. Id.
93. In 2008 dollars, the average formerly incarcerated white male earned
an average income of $11,140. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776. Translating
that into 2014 dollars, the average formerly incarcerated white male makes
approximately $12,094. See Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers:
All Items, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/
series/CPIAUCSL# (last visited Apr. 6, 2015) (providing translating data for
determining 2014 figure).
94. See Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1776 (finding that formerly incarcerated black men earn $8,012 per year in 2008 dollars, and formerly incarcerated Hispanic men earn $10,432 per year in 2008 dollars). In 2014 dollars,
formerly incarcerated black men earn on average $8,698 per year and formerly
incarcerated Hispanic men earn $11,325 per year. See Consumer Price Index,
supra note 93 (providing translating data for determining 2014 figures). For
more details on the disproportionate effect that incarceration plays on minorities’ economic mobility and earning power, see Western & Pettit, supra note
88, at 12–14.
95. See Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions:
Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457, 491–92 (2010)
(documenting the denial of public housing based on criminal convictions);
Western & Pettit, supra note 88 (documenting the stigmatizing effect of criminal convictions in employment).
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96

dividual and his or her family. This debt also stands to exacerbate racial disparities that already exist in society.
Despite offenders’ inability to pay, courts continue to impose economic sanctions; as a result, the number of people owing court-imposed monetary sanctions continues to rise. In
1991, 25% of individuals leaving prison owed fees; by 2004, that
97
number increased to 66%. Today, it is estimated that as many
98
as 80% to 85% of individuals leaving prison owe fees. By 2011,
offenders owed more than $50 billion in criminal justice debt
99
across the country.
Economic sanctions can prove debilitating to an offender.
Failure to pay can generate late fees, interest, and additional
100
collection fees. These additional costs exacerbate the severity
of the already-onerous fees and fines imposed by the court.
Nonpayment may lead to driver’s license suspension, wage
garnishment, prolonged court supervision, arrest warrants, and
101
incarceration. It also subjects individuals to aggressive collection tactics and “payment plan” fines that often result in in102
surmountable debt. Punishment for nonpayment affects more
than just the individual who incurs the debt; it affects the lives
of the family and friends who assist the individual upon reentry
103
to a community.
Debilitating criminal justice debt is damaging for society at
large as well. Debt collection consumes time public employees
could spend doing traditional functions, thus increasing the
cost of court operations. Moreover, the aggressive collection tactics like wage and tax garnishment may deter individuals from
104
obtaining traditional employment. For some, it may incentivize a turn toward underground economies and even criminal
105
behavior. Recidivism comes at a high cost to society. Not only
does it threaten public safety, but recidivism negates the in96. See MITALI NAGRECHA & MARY FAINSOD KATZENSTEIN, CTR. FOR
CMTY. ALTS., FIRST PERSON ACCOUNTS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: WHEN
ALL ELSE FAILS, FINING THE FAMILY 3 (2015), available at http://
communityalternatives.org/pdf/Criminal-Justice-Debt.pdf.
97. Harris et al., supra note 3, at 1769.
98. Shapiro, supra note 66.
99. EVANS, supra note 55, at 4.
100. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1.
101. ACLU, supra note 24, at 5–9; BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 11.
102. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, PROFITING FROM PROBATION: AMERICA’S
“OFFENDER-FUNDED” PROBATION INDUSTRY 14, 43, 55 (2014).
103. NAGRECHA & KATZENSTEIN, supra note 96, at 3.
104. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 27.
105. See id.
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vestment that society already placed in punishing and rehabilitating an offender in the first instance.
In fact, the additional cost municipalities pay to punish
debtors may outweigh the amount recovered through collec106
tion. Enforcement measures, including incarceration, use system resources, including the processing time spent by employees and possible processing through the jail system. These real
costs may not be recouped by the collection of outstanding legal
financial obligations. A 2011 study in Massachusetts concluded
that an additional jail fee would increase taxpayer expense because of the resources required for successful implementa107
tion. In Rhode Island, a 2008 study demonstrated that incarcerating individuals for failure to pay debts in many instances
resulted in the state spending more money on enforcement
108
than the offenders owed in total court debt.
In theory, economic sanctions are limited by an offender’s
“ability to pay.” In 1983, the Supreme Court held in Bearden v.
Georgia that no individual may be incarcerated for their non109
willful failure to pay court-imposed financial obligations.
However, evidence suggests that courts routinely fail to adequately assess a defendant’s ability to pay. In 2010, the Brennan Center released a report on fees and fines imposed on de110
fendants in fifteen states. The report concludes: “Despite the
fact that most criminal defendants are indigent, none of the fifteen examined states pay adequate attention to whether [these]
individuals have the resources to pay criminal justice debt, either when courts determine how much debt to impose or during
111
the debt collection process.” A growing body of literature sup112
ports this assertion.
Moreover, states do not provide meaningful standards or
methodologies for ability-to-pay determinations. For example,
106. See ROOPAL PATEL & MEGHNA PHILIP, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A TOOLKIT FOR ACTION 5–6 (2012).
107. Id. at 11.
108. Id. at 12.
109. 461 U.S. 660 (1983).
110. The Brennan Center studied practices and statutes in the fifteen
states with the largest prison populations in 2010: California, Arizona, Texas,
Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, North Carolina, Virginia, New York,
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri. BANNON ET AL., supra
note 10, at 1, 6.
111. Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted).
112. See, e.g., ACLU, supra note 24; Harris et al., supra note 3; PATEL &
PHILIP, supra note 106; Nate Rawlings, Welcome to Prison. Will You Be Paying
Cash or Credit?, TIME (Aug. 21, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/08/21/
welcome-to-prison-will-you-be-paying-cash-or-credit.
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there is no consensus amongst courts as to when or how to determine ability to pay. Michigan requires courts to make ability-to-pay assessments according to a “manifest hardship”
113
standard. However, courts do not make that assessment before imposing fees and fines; rather, courts only make that assessment when the fee is enforced and the defendant challeng114
es that enforcement based upon his or her ability to pay. As a
result, courts across the state routinely fail to make this as115
sessment. Even where courts do make this assessment, the
defendant bears a “heavy burden of establishing his extraordinary financial circumstances” and lower courts are granted
116
broad discretion to decide how to assess ability to pay. As another example, Ohio requires lower courts to consider the offender’s financial resources and future ability to pay before im117
posing economic sanctions.
A hearing on this issue is
permissible, but not required. Nevertheless, an American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) of Ohio investigation demonstrates
that twenty-two percent of bookings in a rural county related to
118
failure to pay fines. The report explains that individuals who
failed to pay court fees and fines were summoned into court,
assigned an arbitrary monthly payment plan without analysis
119
of ability to pay, and later arrested based on failure to pay. A
120
similar problem exists across the state. These states demonstrate that “ability to pay” is a difficult and sometimes arbitrary assessment left to the lower courts to determine and define.
The lack of guidance to courts results in vastly different
approaches to the fundamental question of whether an offender
113. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 771.3(6)(b) (2015) (allowing courts to consider
whether “payment of the amount due will impose a manifest hardship on the
probationer or his or her immediate family”); Id. § 780.766(12) (allowing courts
to consider whether payment of restitution “will impose a manifest hardship
on the defendant or his or her immediate family”); People v. Jackson, 769
N.W.2d 630, 633 (Mich. 2009) (“[O]nce an ability-to-pay assessment is triggered, the court must consider whether the defendant remains indigent and
whether repayment would cause manifest hardship.”) (overruling People v.
Dunbar, 690 N.W.2d 476 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)).
114. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d at 645.
115. See Brief of Amici Curiae The ACLU Fund of Mich. et al. in Support of
Joseph Bailey, supra note 24.
116. Jackson, 769 N.W.2d at 645.
117. OHIO REV. CODE § 2929.19(B)(5) (2015).
118. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF OHIO, THE OUTSKIRTS OF HOPE: HOW
OHIO DEBTORS’ PRISONS ARE RUINING LIVES AND COSTING COMMUNITIES 8
(2013).
119. Id. at 8.
120. See id. at 9.
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has the ability to pay. Some courts may look at the defendant’s
121
present ability to pay, while others may make predictions
about a defendant’s future ability to pay after a term of incar122
ceration. Still others do not consider ability to pay before the
imposition of fines, but instead wait until an offender’s postimposition non-payment to decide whether the offender should
123
be punished for failure to pay. As a result, the amount of economic sanctions imposed on similar offenders may vary between and within jurisdictions.
The current disparities in sentencing with economic sanctions are intolerable. Since the 1970s, the distinction between
124
“warranted” and “unwarranted” disparities has grown. “Unwarranted” disparities are generally considered those disparities between offender sentences based upon race, geography, or
the philosophical leanings of a particular judge. Inter-judge
disparities, meaning disparities between judges within the
125
same jurisdictions, are widely considered unwarranted. In
the context of incarcerative punishments, policy shifted toward
cabining unfettered discretion at sentencing. Limiting standards were introduced to guide discretion and eliminate “unwarranted” disparities that existed amongst jurisdictions across
126
the country. These principles attempted to strike a balance
121. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 771.3(6)(b), 780.766(12) (2014).
122. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.070 (2014) (“[W]henever any judge
. . . .shall sentence any person to pay any fine and costs . . . no commitment or
imprisonment of the defendant shall be made for failure to pay such fine or
costs.”). As of early 2015, a group of policy organizations planned to introduce
legislation referred to as the Prioritizing Restitution and Successful Reentry
Act of 2015. This bill would reform Washington State courts to “determine
that the offender has the current ability to pay the installment amount and
satisfy his or her basic living expenses as defined by RCW 10.101.010.” Poverty Action Network, Columbia Legal Servs. & ACLU of Wash., Prioritizing
Restitution and Successful Reentry Act of 2015, at 10 (on file with author).
This new provision illustrates that the vagueness of the current law results in
alternative temporal analyses of ability to pay. See id.
123. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 7-504(a) (2014) (“A defendant who is unable to pay a fine ordered by a court may apply to the court
for a reduction of the fine.”).
124. Richard S. Frase, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State
Sentencing Guidelines, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 425, 431 (2000) (noting the broad
and bipartisan consensus that emerged in the 1970s amongst lawmakers that
discretion in sentencing should be regulated to reduce disparities in sentencing).
125. Ryan W. Scott, The Effects of Booker on Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparity, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 104, 104 (2009) (“Not all forms of disparity in sentencing are a cause for concern, but inter-judge disparity is widely recognized
as unwarranted.” (citation omitted)).
126. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER 69–85 (1973).
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between individualized justice and equality on one hand, and
127
objectivity and consistency in the law on the other. While
states and the federal system adopted a variety of measures to
128
infuse these principles in sentencing for incarceration, few jurisdictions took any measures to meaningfully guide discretion
129
in the context of economic sanctions. The variety of approaches to using economic sanctions and the punitiveness of debt collection demonstrate the need for principles to guide the discretion of judges and legislatures who impose growing fees and
fines on individual offenders.
III. REINVIGORATING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
THROUGH THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The revised Model Penal Code strives to provide the guiding principles and measures needed to improve the use of economic sanctions in the United States. The ALI seeks to do this
in three ways.
First, it recommends that states eliminate user fees that
treat offenders as a “special class of taxpayers” required to pay
130
for underfunded criminal justice programs and operations.
Specifically, the revised Code states that
No convicted offender . . . shall be held responsible for the payment of costs, fees, and assessments.
Costs, fees, and assessments . . . include financial obligations imposed
by law-enforcement agencies, public-defender agencies, courts, corrections departments, and corrections providers to defray expenses associated with the investigation and prosecution of the offender or cor131
rectional services provided to the offender.

These user fees are some of the most offensive drivers of
criminal justice debt because they do not further any of the
132
traditional purposes of punishment. Rather, these debts at127. Id. at 103–05, 111–15.
128. States adopted several measures to address unwarranted disparities
in sentencing. Primarily, they responded by creating sentencing commissions,
creating guidelines, and increasing appellate review of sentencing decisions.
See Richard S. Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other States, and
the Federal Courts: A Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT’G REP. 69, 69–
70 (1999); Cf. FRANKEL, supra note 126, at 103–24.
129. See Logan & Wright, supra note 46, at 1215–25 (proposing an LFO
“commission” similar to those existing in most states that currently study,
monitor and issue recommendations on incarceration-based sentencing policies).
130. Reitz, supra note 14, at 1757.
131. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04D (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2014).
132. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4 (“Unlike fines, whose purpose is to
punish, and restitution, whose purpose is to compensate victims, user fees are
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133

tend to budget constraints in the justice system. Elimination
of such economic sanctions will reduce the appearance of problematic conflicts of interest in judicial enforcement of criminal
134
justice debt collection. Where the courts are not forced to collect economic sanctions designed exclusively to keep the courthouse doors open, there is less opportunity to question whether
judges impose fines simply to sustain the court. Additionally,
this provision will promote the use of economic sanctions as an
alternative method of punishment. By confining sanctions such
that they must further one of the purposes of punishment, this
provision logically improves economic sanctions by allowing
courts to use them as an exclusive method of punishment.
Second, the revised Code prioritizes economic sanctions for
collection purposes. Currently, states vary in whether restitu135
tion is the first-order item for collection. Under proposed section 6.04(10), offender payments apply to victim restitution
136
first. Moreover, the Code prohibits the payment of any economic sanctions other than restitution as a condition of proba137
tion or parole. This provision is contrary to standard practices
across the country, where payment of any criminal justice debt
may be a condition of probation, parole, or other correctional
138
supervision. These provisions provide sensible improvements
to varying state practices given that restitution is proven to reduce recidivism amongst offenders and promote reintegration
139
into law-abiding society.
Finally, and most important for this discussion, the revised
Code creates the “reasonable financial subsistence” standard.
Section 6.04(b) of the revised Code provides that “No economic
explicitly intended to raise revenue.”); see also The Colbert Report (Comedy
Central television broadcast June 11, 2014).
133. BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 4.
134. See id. at 30 (discussing courts’ conflicts of interest).
135. EVANS, supra note 55, at 6; Ruback, supra note 79, at 1792–94.
136. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(10) (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2014) (“If the court imposes multiple economic sanctions including victim
compensation, the court shall order that payment of victim compensation take
priority over the other economic sanctions.”).
137. See id. § 6.03(8) (permitting “[g]ood-faith efforts to make payment of
victim restitution under § 6.04A” as the only economic sanction that can be
enforced as a condition of probation).
138. The Brennan Center concluded in 2010 that “[a]ll fifteen states studied in this report make at least some forms of criminal justice debt a condition
of probation and parole, including for the indigent, putting individuals at risk
of incarceration if a court finds that missed payments were willful.” BANNON
ET AL., supra note 10, at 21.
139. See Ruback, supra note 79, at 1812–13.
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sanction may be imposed unless the offender would retain sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family obliga140
tions after compliance with the sanction.”
This provision
acknowledges the reality that the massive growth in the criminal justice system has a concentrated effect on communities
141
suffering from the most severe socioeconomic inequality. As
such, the rise of economic sanctions has placed additional eco142
nomic burdens on the backs of those least capable of paying.
The “reasonable financial subsistence” standard improves
economic sanctions in two ways. First, it confronts the reality
that mass incarceration disproportionately affects socioeconomically disadvantaged populations. As Bruce Western and Becky
Pettit explain, “[m]ost of the growth in incarceration rates [between 1980 and 2008] is concentrated at the very bottom,
143
among young men with very low levels of education.” By
2008, 37% of black men without a high school diploma were in
144
prison or jail. By comparison, only 12% of white men without
145
a high school diploma were incarcerated. Incarceration is
highly concentrated in urban communities of color that system146
ically lack economic stability. A 2011 study by the Pew Research Center found that the median wealth of white households has grown to twenty times that of black households and
147
eighteen times that of Hispanic households. While wealth de140. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2014).
141. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, COLLATERAL COSTS:
INCARCERATION’S EFFECT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY 4–5 (2010), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcs_assets/2010/
CollateralCosts1pdf.pdf; WASH. OFFICE OF PUB. DEF., DETERMINING AND
VERIFYING INDIGENCY FOR PUBLIC DEFENSE 19 (2014), available at
http://www.opd.wa.gov/documents/0185-2014_Determining_Indigency.pdf (estimating that 80% to 90% of defendants qualify for indigent representation);
Western & Pettit, supra note 88, at 8 (“The social inequality produced by mass
incarceration is sizable and enduring for three main reasons: it is invisible, it
is cumulative, and it is intergenerational.”).
142. See Reitz, supra note 14, at 1757–66 (stating that because most offenders come from the lowest rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, “to require
offenders to pay for government interventions that are forced upon them is
regressive taxation taken to an extreme”).
143. Western & Pettit, supra note 88, at 10.
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 6–7 (2010); TODD R. CLEAR,
IMPRISONING
COMMUNITIES:
HOW
MASS
INCARCERATION
MAKES
DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 3 (2007).
147. PAUL TAYLOR ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., TWENTY-TO-ONE: WEALTH
GAPS RISE TO RECORD HIGHS BETWEEN WHITES, BLACKS AND HISPANICS 1
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clined in all households during the Great Recession, it dipped
148
disproportionately amongst minority households. Moreover,
minority households have struggled more to recover wealth
149
during the subsequent economic recovery. These realities illustrate that incarceration disproportionately affects those
communities that have the least economic stability. The “reasonable financial subsistence” standard takes this into account
by trying to assess how much income an individual requires to
maintain their own families before determining how much the
150
state may take as a method of punishment.
Second, this standard rises above the constitutional floor
created by the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on debtors’ prisons. In Bearden v. Georgia, a Georgia court revoked a defendant’s probation for failure to pay a $550 fine in the period prescribed by the sentencing judge, and instead placed the
151
individual in jail for the rest of his probation period. The Supreme Court struck down the incarceration period and re152
manded the case to the Georgia court for further analysis. As
the Bearden Court explained, “if [a] probationer has made all
reasonable efforts to pay the fine or restitution, and yet cannot
do so through no fault of his own, it is fundamentally unfair to
revoke probation automatically without considering whether
adequate alternative methods of punishing the defendant are
153
available.” The Georgia court neither made an assessment of
whether the defendant willfully failed to pay his fine; nor did it
take into consideration alternatives, such as extending the period for making payments, reducing the fine, or directing the
probationer to do community service rather than make mone154
tary payment. As such, the Supreme Court held the revoca(2011), available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/07/SDT-Wealth
-Report_7-26-11_FINAL.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened
Along Racial, Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial
-wealth-gaps-great-recession.
150. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) cmt. h (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2014) (suggesting total economic sanctions be limited so offenders retain
sufficient means for family obligations).
151. 461 U.S. 660, 663 (1982). The sentencing judge imposed a $500 fine
and ordered the defendant to pay $250 in restitution for burglary and theft.
Id. at 662. The defendant paid $200 upfront in accordance with the court’s order, but failed to pay the $550 balance within the four month period ordered
by the court. Id. at 662–63.
152. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 674.
153. Id. at 668–69.
154. Id. at 672–74 (“[T]he sentencing court could extend the time for mak-
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155

tion of probation unconstitutional. This case, along with a series of cases arising before the Court in that period, prohibits
incarcerating an individual solely due to nonwillful inability to
156
pay fines.
Here, the Code takes a pivotal step forward by trying to define parameters for ability to pay—namely, that an offender
157
must retain sufficient finances for personal expenditures.
This principle values the law-abiding reintegration of offenders
158
over considerations of retribution alone. While the Court in
Bearden conceded that inability to pay may include failure to
seek employment or borrow money as means to pay the debt
159
owed to society, this new standard focuses on what the individual needs to reintegrate rather than what that individual
can do to change his or her situation. As such, this concept of
reasonable subsistence is explicitly higher than the constitu160
tional floor. Moreover, by creating a cap on economic sanctions, the Code requires courts to evaluate all the monetary
fees and fines imposed on the individual. Courts must also assess the ability to pay before the imposition of this sanction—a
practice not routine among the courts. These are meaningful
developments.
Though these improvements are meaningful, the Code
leaves legislatures and courts wide discretion to define reason161
able financial subsistence. The revised Code suggests that
legislatures may go beyond the Code in defining an ability-topay standard for use by the courts. It even goes so far as to pro162
vide proposed language for a provision. To the courts, the
ing payments, or reduce the fine, or direct that the probationer perform some
form of labor or public service in lieu of the fine.”).
155. Id. at 674.
156. See e.g., id.; Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 400–01 (1971); Williams v.
Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 244–45 (1970).
157. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(6) cmt. h (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2014).
158. Id. (noting the goal of the Code is to not “allow economic penalties to
override the goal of returning offenders to productive lives”).
159. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 (“[A] probationer’s failure to make sufficient
bona fide efforts to seek employment or borrow money in order to pay the fine
or restitution may reflect an insufficient concern for paying the debt he owes
to society for his crime.”).
160. Id. (“Subsection (6) is based on grounds of public policy, not the minimum requirements of Due Process. . . .”).
161. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2014) (noting that “[s]ome jurisdictions may choose to adopt particularized
rules to help implement the broad [reasonable subsistence] principle”).
162. Id. (“No economic sanction may be imposed on an indigent offender as
defined by the state’s eligibility rules for appointment of counsel in a criminal
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Comments explain, “reasonable financial subsistence” rises
163
above the constitutional minimum set by federal law. This
leaves wide discretion to courts in the absence of legislation.
The Code falls short of defining reasonable financial sub164
sistence with specificity. The Code’s gap in definition reflects
a policy decision to allow courts and legislators the opportunity
to explore alternative working standards for reasonable sub165
sistence. Rather than define criteria, the Code defines the
question with precision – whether the person could maintain
reasonable financial subsistence while paying the fees and fines
imposed by a court. As such, the Code asks courts to continue
an analysis it already conducts: tailoring fees and fines to the
166
circumstances of the individual. But without specified criteria, there is room for courts to continue struggling with ability
to pay analyses. As a result, the disparities in sentencing that
contribute to the offensiveness of economic sanctions are likely
to persist.
IV. BUILDING ON THE CODE AND ROADBLOCKS TO
REFORM
In adopting the new Model Penal Code’s “reasonable financial subsistence” standard, most states would take a huge
stride toward improving the use of economic sanctions in their
courts. Nevertheless, the Code may not, and probably cannot,
resolve persistent failure to pay court-imposed fees and the accompanying problems of criminal justice debt because they are
symptoms of larger, systemic shortcomings. In this section, I
briefly set forth practical reforms that build on the strides taken by the Model Penal Code. I also identify two systemic trends
that converge at the site of economic sanctions and criminal
justice debt: underfunded courts and budget-cut criminal justice reform. For the reasons discussed here, the realities of thecase. Qualification for or receipt of any of the following public benefits shall
serve as evidence that the offender would not retain sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family obligations after compliance with one or
more economic sanctions.”).
163. Id. (describing the relationship between reasonable financial subsistence and federal constitutional law).
164. Id. (detailing different approaches states may take in implementing
the reasonable financial subsistence principle).
165. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2014) (describing states’ ability to customize the principle for application within its jurisdiction).
166. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1982) (describing “the general flexibility of tailoring fines to the resources of a defendant”).
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se trends will influence “improvement” of economic sanctions as
much as the revised Model Penal Code itself.
A. BUILDING ON THE CODE: PRACTICAL REFORMS TO INFORM
ECONOMIC SANCTIONS
The imposition of onerous fees and fines is, on the one
hand, an issue of lack of information. The amount of fees imposed on individuals can be difficult to quantify, and few understand or can assess the amount of fees and fines facing individual offenders as they are processed through the criminal
167
justice system. The Code addresses this information gap by
168
making the sentencing judge the only purveyor of fees. To
build on this, however, a central agency or entity should compile information about the imposition of fees and fines to better
understand their breadth. Sentencing commissions, already in
existence, represent one agency that is well-equipped to further
169
study this issue. These agencies typically collect data on sentencing practices and trends, and issue policy recommendations
on potential sentencing reforms to improve the justice sys170
tem. Often, these agencies aggregate data on characteristics
of the individual offenders, the types of offenses imposed in the
171
courts, and the length of sentence received by an offender.
Expanding the scope of their focus to include trends and practices in economic sanctions would be a logical expansion of sentencing commissions’ role in informing judicial sentencing practices.
An independent agency that follows the individual offender
rather than the court could be another viable alternative. For
example, Georgia created the Georgia Superior Court Clerks’
Cooperative Authority (GSCCCA) to monitor the collection of
court-imposed fees and fines by the lower courts and standard167. See, e.g., Katherine Beckett & Alexes Harris, On Cash and Conviction:
Monetary Sanctions As Misguided Policy, 10 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 509,
513 (2011) (“It is not just the courts that have been authorized to impose monetary sanctions; a broad range of criminal justice agencies now are permitted
to levy such fees.”); ACLU, supra note 24, at 11 (calling for further data collection on the issue of criminal justice debt).
168. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04(2) cmt. e (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2014) (“One guiding premise of § 6.04 is that all economic sanctions . . . must be considered by sentencing courts as a package . . . [thus placing] the sentencing court in control of the total amount of all economic sanctions that will be imposed on an offender.”).
169. See Logan & Wright, supra note 46, at 1215–26 (recommending sentencing commissions as entities well-equipped to monitor LFOs).
170. Id. at 1215 (describing the current work of sentencing commissions).
171. See id.
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172

ize their allocation.
Using its CourtTRAX system, the
GSCCCA centralizes information on the collection of fees and
173
fines across the state as part of a “fees and fines project.”
Currently, the agency’s data collection does not capture the
amount of fees and fines imposed on an individual offender, nor
174
does it capture the amount of debt outstanding in the state. It
could do this without much difficulty, however, given that it
175
monitors fees and fines collection from all courts in the state.
A similar monitoring system could be created, either run
through this agency or by a nonprofit organization, to follow
the individuals providing the funding as well as the funds once
176
collected by the court.
Another challenge is better informing the sentencing judge
on how to assess an offender’s ability to pay. Judicial training
programs and checklists would combat some of the quick response solutions—including incarceration—that often befall individuals who fail to pay legal financial obligations when they
177
appear before a court repeatedly. The Supreme Court of Ohio
172. See 2004 Ga. Laws ES3 (establishing the fees and fines project in
Georgia and establishing the GSCCCA as the “collecting and remitting agent
for the centralized collection and remittance of certain court costs and fees and
certain additional penalties and bonds in criminal cases”).
173. Id.
174. See Ga. Superior Court Clerks’ Coop. Auth., Reports, COURTTRAX
(2015), http://www.courttrax.org/reportsCanned.asp (describing the aggregation of reported data at the court level).
175. This includes collecting monthly reports on legal financial obligation
collection from the superior courts, state courts, probate courts, municipal
courts, magistrate courts and juvenile courts in the state. Id.
176. There are nonprofit organizations that monitor the amount of fees and
fines imposed on individual offenders. For example, in 2008 the Rhode Island
Family Life Center issued a report on its three year, independent study of
court debt in the state. That report concluded that 18% of all jailings were on
account of failure to pay court debts, which average $826 per offender. R.I.
FAMILY LIFE CTR., COURT DEBT AND RELATED INCARCERATION IN RHODE
ISLAND FROM 2005 THROUGH 2007, at 4 (2008), available at http://www
.opendoorsri.org/sites/default/files/CourtDebt.pdf. More recently, the ACLU of
Washington conducted a year-long study estimating that 20% of individuals
incarcerated in the Benton County were incarcerated for failure to pay court
debt, which averages $2,540 per case. ACLU OF WASH. & COLUMBIA LEGAL
SERVS., MODERN-DAY DEBTORS’ PRISONS: THE WAYS COURT-IMPOSED DEBTS
PUNISH PEOPLE FOR BEING POOR 3–4 (2014), available at https://aclu
-wa.org/LFO. Such reports suggest that monitoring systems need not be created by state agencies alone, as nonprofit organizations demonstrate an ability
to fill the gap in how much an individual faces in criminal justice debt and
how collection is enforced.
177. Bret Crow, Bench Card Offers Guidance on Collection of Court Fines,
Costs, COURT NEWS OHIO (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.courtnewsohio.gov/
happening/2014/benchCards_020414.asp#.VNKrXGTF9XY (describing the
clarity provided by judicial training and reference materials regarding when
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recently took steps to address this concern through the issuance of “bench cards” for all state judges to clarify how better to
178
address the collection of fees and fines. This two-page document, circulated to all state judges, defines and distinguishes
fines versus court costs, and details enforcement options for
179
both types of legal financial obligations. By providing the
courts with a list of collection methods, this measure may negate the impulse to incarcerate without full consideration of
180
other enforcement methods. Alternatively, judges could receive training to understand the alternative sanctions that are
available for failure to pay, including community service pro181
grams and alternative payment plan options. Such training
would provide judges with information to better understand the
offender’s ability to pay and their enforcement options.
The revised Code’s “reasonable financial subsistence”
standard combats this problem by requiring courts to obtain in182
formation to make the assessment. The actual method of information collection, however, is left unspecified. One method
of assessment that makes sense is the presumption of a waiver
of fees and fines where an individual already receives any public welfare benefits. Indeed, the Code suggests this measure in
the comments, though it is not set forth within the Code it183
self. This reform has practical appeal. In Maricopa County,
Arizona, for example, the county courts provide fee deferrals for
certain individuals whose income is less than 150% of the fed-

incarceration is appropriate for enforcing fines).
178. Id.
179. OFFICE OF JUDICIAL SERVS., SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, COLLECTION
OF FINES AND COURT COSTS IN ADULT TRIAL COURTS 2 (2014), available at
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Publications/JCS/finesCourtCosts.pdf.
180. Id. (clarifying for judges that they are not allowed to use jail as a
method of collection for costs).
181. Id. (describing two alternate methods of resolution: cancellation and
community service).
182. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. h (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2014).
183. In the comments to section 6.04, the Reporters set forth a provision
that was “too specific to be included” but “consistent with the spirit of subsection (6),” which states:
No economic sanction may be imposed on an indigent offender as defined by the state’s eligibility rules for appointment of counsel in a
criminal case. Qualification for or receipt of any of the following public benefits shall serve as evidence that the offender would not retain
sufficient means for reasonable living expenses and family obligations
after compliance with one or more economic sanctions.
Id.
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184

eral poverty level. The deferral package allows the individual
to share his or her financial situation with the court at an early
stage in the criminal justice process, thus providing the sen185
tencing judge with additional information at sentencing. Replicating such documentation in jurisdictions across the country
would do much to give judges a sense of what types of financial
obligations individuals face and how additional criminal justice
debt could affect their ability to reintegrate into society successfully.
B. ROADBLOCKS TO IMPROVEMENT: INTERSECTING TRENDS IN
JUSTICE REFORM
On a larger scale, the accumulation of economic sanctions
and the accrual of criminal justice debt are the side effects of
two larger trends in criminal justice reform. First, state courts
are persistently underfunded, leading courts to seek revenue
186
through economic sanctions. While economic sanctions always existed, additional fees and fines proliferated in the
187
1990s. By 2003, the Conference of State Court Administrators declared that state courts were facing “the worst fiscal cri188
sis in many decades.” This issue came to a head with the
Great Recession of 2008. As one scholar notes, “[i]n most states,
courts received 10 to 15 percent less funding in the years 2008
189
through 2011 than they did in 2007.” By 2010, more than for184. The fee deferral option exists for court fees or costs in family court,
tax, civil, juvenile and mental health cases. SUPERIOR COURT OF ARIZ., FEE
DEFERRAL APPLICATION (2014), available at http://www.superiorcourt
.maricopa.gov/sscDocs/packets/gnf1z.pdf (citing an income less than 150% of
the federal poverty line as one basis for deferral).
185. Id. (noting the application is to be used “at the beginning of the case”).
186. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, POSITION PAPER ON STATE
JUDICIAL BRANCH BUDGETS IN TIMES OF FISCAL CRISIS 2 (2003), available at
http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/Budget
WhitePaper.ashx (“State judicial systems . . . have found it difficult to obtain
adequate resources even in good economic times.”).
187. In 1986, the Conference of State Court Administrators issued a set of
standards related to court filing fees, surcharges, and miscellaneous fees in
response to the burgeoning reliance upon courts to generate revenue to fund
both the courts and other functions of government. See generally CONFERENCE
OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COURT COSTS: FEES,
MISCELLANEOUS CHARGES AND SURCHARGES AND A NATIONAL SURVEY OF
PRACTICE (1986). The prevalence of the practice has expanded and intensified
since the 1990s. See, e.g., CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, COURTS ARE
NOT REVENUE CENTERS 1 (2012), available at http://cosca.ncsc.org/~/media/
Microsites/Files/COSCA/Policy%20Papers/CourtsAreNotRevenueCenters
-Final.ashx (renewing examination due to persistence of the issue).
188. CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT ADM’RS, supra note 186, at 2.
189. Michael J. Graetz, Trusting the Courts: Redressing the State Court
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190

ty states cut their courts’ funding. In response, state courts
191
started seeking revenue to support their operational costs.
Whether judges impose more fees and harsher fines in
light of fiscal scarcity is an issue that deserves more research.
At the very least, state legislatures do not deter such action
192
when they expand mandatory economic sanctions. In some
instances, they are actively encouraging courts to use sanctions
to supplement necessary operational costs. The Oklahoma state
courts have collected more in the last five years than in any
193
other time in state history. In response, the legislature decreased state appropriations to the courts, reducing their fund194
ing by seven percent in 2014. In fact, the state’s 2014 budget
praises the courts for attaining “the highest court fund collec195
tions possible.” Such statements create a perverse incentive
196
for judges to increase the imposition of fees and fines. It may
197
also compromise judicial impartiality at sentencing.
Even where fees and fines do not directly fund court operational costs, they often will fund general state budgets or unreFunding Crisis, DAEDALUS, Summer 2014, at 96, 97.
190. Id.
191. See, e.g., Maura Dolan, Cutbacks in California Court System Produce
Long Lines, Short Tempers, L.A. TIMES (May 10, 2014), http://www.latimes
.com/local/la-me-court-cuts-20140511-story.html (noting that the Kings County Superior Court “resorted to holding a garage sale to raise money”); BANNON
ET AL., supra note 10, at 30 (“All of the states studied in this report use criminal justice debt to provide budgetary support to courts.”).
192. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 1 (describing expanded use of
fees in light of the fiscal crisis).
193. Suzy Khimm, Will the Government Stop Using the Poor As a Piggy
Bank?, MSNBC (Sept. 9, 2014, 3:27 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/will
-the-government-stop-using-the-poor-piggy-bank.
194. Id.
195. MARY FALLIN, EXECUTIVE BUDGET FOR FISCAL YEAR ENDING JUNE 30,
2015 B-36 (2014), available at http://www.ok.gov/OSF/documents/bud15.pdf.
196. See Khimm, supra note 193 (suggesting some judges have increased
momentum for revenue collection in response to praise in Governor Fallin’s
budget).
197. See BANNON ET AL., supra note 10, at 30 (“[I]n its most extreme form,
[reliance on fees] threaten[s] the impartiality of judges and other court personnel with institutional, pecuniary incentives.”); Logan & Wright, supra note
46, at 1201–03 (chronicling limited concern for enforcement and collection
neutrality in the courts). U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 42 (2015) (“The impact that revenue concerns have on court operations undermines the court’s
role as a fair and impartial judicial body.”). The Brennan Center further asserts that similar perverse incentives exist at various points in the criminal
justice system during the era of mass incarceration, from police and asset forfeiture to prosecutors and conviction rate rewards. See CHETTIAR ET AL., supra
note 43, at 11–12.
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lated criminal justice system costs, such as rehabilitative pro198
grams unrelated to the particular individual’s offense. Such
costs present a regressive tax on individuals in the criminal
justice system to support government functions that the taxpaying public enjoys without understanding the “real costs of
199
enforcement.” As such, it can distort the public’s perception of
how much the current justice system actually costs as well as
200
the actual benefits or burdens gained from this system.
Second, the desire to cut costs through reforms in the criminal justice system will influence and potentially prevent improvements to economic sanctions in the states. The United
States finds itself at a pivotal moment in reshaping punitive
policies that have sustained overreliance on incarceration for
more than thirty-five years. Conservative and progressive
lawmakers alike are calling for reconsideration of policies that
harshly punish low-level, nonviolent offenders as a measure to
save taxpayer money and improve the effectiveness of the jus201
tice system. In response, states are revisiting and expanding
alternatives to incarceration, decriminalization of low-level
202
crimes, and graduated sanctions.
But in reality, reducing incarceration costs money, too. Alternatives to incarceration and treatment programs are less
203
expensive than incarceration, but they are not without costs,
many of which are being offset onto the individuals being processed through the justice system. Individuals now pay for
204
court-ordered supervision, electronic monitoring, drug test198. Khimm, supra note 193 (noting that fees are channeled into the state’s
general revenue fund).
199. Logan & Wright, supra note 46, at 1178.
200. Id.
201. See BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, SOLUTIONS: AMERICAN LEADERS
SPEAK OUT ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE (2015) (compiling conservative and progressive lawmakers views on criminal justice reform); Eaglin, supra note 26, at
191 n.5; Fan, supra note 26, at 583 (detailing bipartisan reform movements).
202. Allegra M. McLeod, Decarceration Courts: Possibilities and Perils of a
Shifting Criminal Law, 100 GEO. L.J. 1587, 1590–91 (2012).
203. See, e.g., Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler, Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal Court, FED. PROBATION, Sept. 2009, at 3, 6 (calculating
that pretrial detention costs $19,000 on average while nonincarcerative supervision costs between $3,100 and $4,600 per defendant).
204. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 791.285(b)(2) (2006) (requiring individuals in the lifetime electronic monitoring program to reimburse the department for the actual costs of monitoring the individual); Samuel R. Wiseman,
Pretrial Detention and the Right To Be Monitored, 123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1374
(2014) (“[F]or better or worse, it is likely that monitoring programs will shift
pretrial flight prevention costs to defendants; some defendants in pretrial release programs already pay for the cost of their own monitoring.”).
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ing, drug treatment, diversion programs, and more. These alternatives are necessary to reduce reliance on incarceration,
but truly moving beyond mass incarceration—including using
economic sanctions in a way that is productive and proportionate—requires changing the way we punish for more than just
cost-cutting reasons. It requires rethinking the role of punishment in the criminal justice system and in society more broadly.
The Model Penal Code takes an important stride toward
this type of fundamental rethinking, as it refocuses economic
sanctions around the goal of successful reintegration into socie206
ty. There is reason to believe that broader public and political
opinion has not similarly reoriented itself around this framework, despite the apparent shift toward rehabilitative reforms.
As I explain elsewhere, neorehabilitative reforms maintain the
same framework of exclusion that created policies that increased prison populations, even though the rhetoric of reform
207
has changed. Accordingly, unless and until the public and
208
politicians develop the will to fund a reintegrative system,
economic sanctions may be another alternative to incarceration
implemented in the wrong way despite the ALI’s efforts to the
209
contrary.
Though the revised Model Penal Code takes important
steps to curtail the likelihood of excessive economic sanctions,
their occurrence likely will not recede without either or both of
these broader trends reversing course as well. Without additional funding, the courts have little incentive to engage in
meaningful ability-to-pay determinations for offenders facing
210
mounting criminal justice debt. Similarly, legislators have lit205. Some of these costs may decline as technological alternatives expand.
See Erin Murphy, Paradigms of Restraint, 57 DUKE L.J. 1321, 1371 (2008)
(“[U]nlike the level or even escalating costs of physical forms of incapacitation,
the cost of imposing a technological restraint may decrease over its period of
use.”).
206. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 6.04 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No.
3, 2014).
207. See Eaglin, supra note 26, at 222–25.
208. Id. at 225 (noting that a reintegrative model of punishment could lead
to permanent reduction in the U.S. prison population); Robert Weisberg &
Joan Petersilia, The Dangers of Pyrrhic Victories Against Mass Incarceration,
DAEDALUS, Summer 2010, at 124, 129 (urging advocates to simultaneously
focus on reducing mass incarceration and “the sufficient infusion of funds to
help criminal offenders become law-abiding citizens”).
209. See Weisberg & Petersilia, supra note 208, at 127 (explaining that “it
is puzzlingly easy to implement alternative sanctions in the wrong way”).
210. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
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tle incentive to encourage them to do so. Moreover, until states
start investing more funds in alternatives to incarceration,
lawmakers will try to offset the costs of justice system on indi211
viduals least likely to be able to pay. In turn, failure to pay
criminal justice debt will persist. But as pressure to create costeffective alternatives to incarceration increase, there is little
incentive to shift more of the costs toward the state and away
from the individual.
CONCLUSION
Economic sanctions are but one of a plethora of methods a
court may select for punishment. Until this point, economic
sanctions have been used as a supplement to reform rather
than an alternative. The Model Penal Code intervenes at a critical juncture with a revised approach. The Code emphasizes
that fees and fines are punishment in and of themselves, rather
than a supplement. It also aptly places the court as a check on
excessive fines from the legislature. But the interventions by
the Model Penal Code alone will not eliminate the disproportionately severe effects this method of punishment inflicts on
the poor through the creation of criminal justice debt. Additional reforms are necessary. Moreover, successful implementation of the revised Code’s policies is inextricably linked with
other trends in justice reform. Unless advocates and lawmakers
fund courts and move beyond the cost-cutting framework to
justice reform, the efforts to improve economic sanctions in the
states will remain tenuous at best.

211. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.

